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Abstract
As climate change intensiﬁes, global publics will experience more unusual weather and extreme
weather events. How will individual experiences with these weather trends shape climate change
beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors? In this article, we review 73 papers that have studied the relationship
between climate change experiences and public opinion. Overall, we ﬁnd mixed evidence that weather
shapes climate opinions. Although there is some support for a weak effect of local temperature and
extreme weather events on climate opinion, the heterogeneity of independent variables, dependent
variables, study populations, and research designs complicate systematic comparison. To advance
research on this critical topic, we suggest that future studies pay careful attention to differences
between self-reported and objective weather data, causal identiﬁcation, and the presence of spatial
autocorrelation in weather and climate data. Reﬁning research designs and methods in future studies
will help us understand the discrepancies in results, and allow better detection of effects, which have
important practical implications for climate communication. As the global population increasingly
experiences weather conditions outside the range of historical experience, researchers, communicators, and policymakers need to understand how these experiences shape-and are shaped by-public
opinions and behaviors.

1. Introduction
Climate change perceptions shape both individual and
societal responses to the climate crisis. For example, an
individual who dismisses the existence of climate
change may underestimate the risk of extreme weather
events and, consequently, may not take appropriate
adaptive actions. Likewise, voters who do not recognize the existence of climate change may be less likely
to support policies that mitigate climate risks. However, humans are poorly equipped to perceive our
changing climate directly. Instead, we perceive shifting
local weather conditions and weather-related extreme
events like heat waves, ﬂoods, and wildﬁres.
Climate change is currently driving these and
other local weather conditions beyond historical ranges. For example, most of the world’s population lives
in places where local temperatures have increased [1].
Our individual and societal ability to detect and
respond to these changes is critical. Can publics accurately perceive shifting temperatures? Do perceptions
© 2019 The Author(s). Published by IOP Publishing Ltd

of local weather trends and weather events shift public
climate perceptions, beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors?
Do individuals attribute these experiences to climate
change? Can these perceptions prompt increased policy action as climate impacts intensify [2–4]? These are
all empirical questions that have drawn the attention
of social scientists over two decades.
In this article, we review scholarship on how personal experiences with environmental phenomena
(including weather and weather-related events) are
associated with climate change perceptions, beliefs,
attitudes, behaviors, and policy support. We collectively refer to these constructs as public opinion about
climate change or climate opinions. As we show,
despite extensive research efforts, the relationship
between weather and climate opinions still remains
unclear. Several recent studies point to an association
between elevated temperatures [5–19] or extreme
weather events [20–27] with greater climate change
concern, belief that human-caused climate change is
happening, or support for climate policies. Other
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studies, however, do not support such a relationship
[28–34]. Prior beliefs and personal experience may
also condition weather perceptions [35–39]. For
example, an individual who is dismissive of climate
change may misperceive their own experiences with
extreme weather events, be less likely to take appropriate adaptive actions, and be more vulnerable to
future climate change impacts [36, 38].
Several previous reviews examine the inﬂuence of
weather on perceptions and opinions of climate
change [40–44]. Most commonly, these reviews have
identiﬁed an effect of temperature anomalies or trends
on public opinion (in this literature, anomaly refers to
a departure from the long-term average value). However, they note that there are gaps in our understanding of the timescales over which weather
inﬂuences public opinion [40, 45], questions about
whether personal experience shapes climate opinions
or whether pre-existing beliefs shape experiences
[41, 44], the need to study these phenomena in a wider
range of populations beyond North America and Europe [40, 41], the need for more longitudinal analyses
[40, 41], and the need for greater consistency in
research practices [40, 41].
Here, we undertake a larger and systematic review
of the growing literature on the relationship between
weather and climate opinion. We review and interpret
this literature to identify consistencies and inconsistencies in research ﬁndings. We then outline the
methodological factors that may explain these contrasting results. We particularly highlight: (1) variation
in how climate and weather4 trends are measured;
(2) inconsistencies in survey wording, sample selection and composition, and variable selection; (3) differences in the spatial and temporal scales of survey
and weather data; (4) uneven attention to causal identiﬁcation; (5) statistical complications due to multiple
comparisons and spatial autocorrelation; and, (6) limited engagement with theory. Based on these ﬁndings,
we then propose directions for future research and
best practices for researchers seeking to understand
the relationship between weather and climate
opinions.

2. Methods
We reviewed articles that empirically investigate the
relationship between public opinion about climate
change and experience with local weather, climate,
and extreme events. We used a systematic search
strategy on the Google Scholar database using the
following keywords: ‘climate,’ ‘warming,’ ‘perceptions,’ ‘opinion,’ ‘weather,’ ‘experience,’ and
‘extreme.’ We also considered articles citing or cited by
relevant identiﬁed articles. Our initial search query
4

We deﬁne ‘weather’ broadly as short-term (e.g. daily) conditions
or variations in the atmosphere, and ‘climate’ as longer-term
conditions or variations.

2

identiﬁed about 16 000 results. To reﬁne our search
further, we considered only the ﬁrst 25 pages of search
results, since results are sorted in descending order by
search relevance.
We then used the following criteria for inclusion:
(1) the article must be published in a peer-reviewed
academic journal; (2) the article must describe a primary empirical study (reviews or primarily theoretical
papers were excluded); (3) the article must examine at
least one of the following constructs related to opinion
about climate change or global warming: belief that
climate change is happening and/or human caused,
worry or concern about climate change, or support for
climate change mitigation and/or adaptation policies;
and (4) the article must examine at least one of the following in association with climate change opinion:
weather conditions, extreme weather events, or climate indicators (e.g. temperature or precipitation
anomalies or trends). Our search is inclusive of papers
published through 1 February, 2019.
Based on these criteria, we identiﬁed 73 articles for
inclusion in this review. These articles were published
between 2006 and 2019.

3. Results and discussion
3.1. Trends in weather effects on climate opinion
There is modest support for an association between
weather experience or extreme events (broadly
deﬁned) and climate opinion. Of the 73 articles
included in this review, 59 (81%) measure a direct
effect on climate opinion from either subjective
experience or measured exposure to a variety of
weather, climate, or extreme event indicators. However, the magnitude of this effect varies widely. As
discussed below, there are substantial differences in
measurement across studies that complicate interpretation or meta-analysis of these results.
3.1.1. Subjective experience and climate opinion
Of the articles reviewed, 32 (44%) examine the
association between subjective experience with abnormal weather conditions or extreme events and climate
opinion. Studies that examine subjective experience
ask participants to self-report whether they have
personally experienced a speciﬁc weather-related
phenomenon, trend, or extreme event [13–15,
24, 32, 36, 38, 46–50], whether they have experienced
its effects [21, 25, 51–54], or if they have generally
experienced unusual weather patterns [55, 56]. Alternatively, some studies ask participants if they have
personally experienced the effects of climate change
itself [37, 57–59]. In some studies, survey questions
about personal experience are also combined with
external observational data on weather conditions or
trends [15, 20, 32, 36, 38, 39, 46, 50, 60, 61].
Based on this literature, there is a fairly robust relationship between perceived or subjective experience
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and related climate opinion questions. Of 32 papers
that address the association between self-reported
experiences and climate opinion, 27 (84%) ﬁnd evidence for such a relationship. For example, a large
study of surveys from 119 countries found that perception of rising temperatures at the local level was an
important predictor of climate risk perceptions [14].
In general, these studies suggest that people who think
they have experienced the effects of global warming
(or have experiences of extreme weather) also tend to
believe that global warming is happening and to be
more concerned about it. However, these studies
alone do not establish a causal relationship between
experience and opinion. Despite the associations identiﬁed in these papers, climate opinions may also shape
the weather-related experiences that people selfreport, as we discuss in section 3.1.4 below.
3.1.2. The effect of objective temperature experiences on
climate opinion
Of the reviewed articles, 51 (70%) examine the
association between externally measured weather variables or extreme events and climate opinion. Of these,
46 (90%) used some measurement of temperature or
temperature-related extreme events (e.g. heat or cold
waves). Temperature is typically operationalized as
either the absolute air temperature over a certain time
period, or a temperature anomaly: the difference in the
absolute temperature from a long-term base period. A
small number of studies also examine trends in
temperature over a set time period. The prevalent use
of temperature as an independent variable likely arises
from its conceptual salience with global warming or
climate change, as well as the ease with which
temperature observations from weather stations or
gridded data can be joined with survey responses by
location.
Among studies that have tested temperature as an
independent variable predicting climate opinion,
some provide evidence for a ‘local warming’ effect (e.g.
[5, 6, 10, 11, 15, 18, 62]), showing that elevated temperatures in the short term (daily to monthly) are associated with increased concern about climate change,
belief that it is happening and human-caused, or policy support. For example, in one analysis, temperature
anomalies in the week prior to a survey predict opinion about whether global warming is happening [9].
These same studies indicate that the magnitude of the
effect is relatively low and not persistent as the experience of elevated temperatures recedes over time (e.g.
[9, 63]). Other studies that have examined associations
between short-term temperature and climate opinions
have found no effect [7, 19, 64].
There are mixed ﬁndings among studies that have
investigated the relationship between longer-term temperatures or temperature trends and public opinion.
The largest recent study of US survey data (N=348,
500) from 1999 to 2017 ﬁnds that higher average annual
temperatures at the state level are associated with a
3

small but robust increase in worry about climate change
[65]. This ﬁnding is reﬂected in similar studies that have
examined seasonal-to-annual temperatures, e.g.
[7, 8, 17, 19, 20, 63, 64, 66–68]. For example three studies ﬁnd that 10 year summer temperature trends are
positively related to beliefs about human-caused global
warming in the US [19, 64, 66]. In addition, an index
representing the ratio of previous record high temperatures to record low temperatures over several years
(with more record high temperatures expected under a
warming climate) is associated with estimates of
county-level climate opinions in the US [12, 69]. However, other studies that have focused on longer-term
temperatures or trends have found little to no effect on
climate opinions [28, 30, 32, 34, 70, 71].
The few longitudinal studies that have examined
how changes in climate opinions may be associated
with local temperature observations have generally
found little to no effect. For example, monthly US
temperature anomalies do not predict changes in opinions over 2.5 years from 2008 to 2011 [31], and there
were minimal effects of monthly temperature anomalies in a large panel analysis of Cooperative Congressional Election Study data over a four-year period
from 2010 to 2014 [72].
3.1.3. The effect of objective non-temperature experiences
on climate opinion
While temperature is the most commonly used
observed weather variable, other studies examine
precipitation observations (e.g. [10, 64, 65]) or derived
climatic variables (such as drought indices) (e.g.
[30, 67]). Of studies that use objective weather data, 21
(41%) use data related to precipitation. In contrast to
temperature, most studies have identiﬁed little to no
association between precipitation or related variables
alone and climate opinions [10, 31, 32, 64]. For
example, a very large study in the US [65] shows no
relationship between median annual precipitation and
climate opinion. By contrast, an earlier US study [20]
does ﬁnd that the seasonal snowfall anomaly (as
compared to the 30 year average) predicts beliefs about
whether global warming is happening in the US
However, this variable is not independent from
temperature, since the occurrence and amount of
snow is related to air temperature.
Beyond temperature and precipitation, some studies have also examined a range of impacts and occurrences of various extreme weather events. Of studies
using external measures rather than self-reported
experiences, 20 (39%) include measures related to
extreme weather events. Several of these studies have
used published aggregated indices of weather extremes
as predictors of climate opinions, such as the US
Climate Extremes Index that combines temperature,
precipitation, drought severity, and landfalling tropical storms [28, 30, 33, 73]. These studies do not ﬁnd a
relationship between these aggregated extremes indices and climate opinions.
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A further set of studies focus explicitly on the relationship between the impacts of weather-related
extreme events and climate opinions, with mixed
results. Several US studies utilize the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration’s Storm Events
Database [74] (or derived products like the Spatial
Hazard Events and Losses Database [75]). This dataset
records the impacts of weather-related events that
cause loss of life, injuries, or major property damage,
or are unusual enough to generate media attention
(georeferenced at the county or forecast area level). For
example, one study [76] examines weather-related
property damage at the county level and does not ﬁnd
a direct effect on climate opinions. Another recent
example [46] ﬁnds that hurricanes, tornadoes, ﬂoods,
and droughts are unrelated to climate opinions, in
contrast to self-reported experience for certain types
of events. This ﬁnding is echoed by several other studies [17, 71, 72]. Yet, a few other studies do ﬁnd that
indices of extreme weather events predict climate opinion, such as a study of US Gulf Coast counties [67], a
national US study using natural hazard fatalities [70],
and a national US study using the number of extreme
weather events by region [22, 23].
A ﬁnal set of papers involve case studies of certain
communities affected by extreme weather events, or
the effect of a speciﬁc event on changes in climate opinion. A set of studies in the UK [21, 24, 53] focus on
the experience of ﬂoods; these ﬁnd that ﬂood impacts
predict climate opinion. However, an earlier UK study
[54] ﬁnds that ﬂood experiences does not affect climate opinion, and a recent study suggests that coping
capacity moderates the negative emotions from a ﬂood
event that would motivate opinion change [52]. A
recent study in the US [77] surveyed four communities
exposed to tornadoes or wildﬁres and ﬁnds that event
proximity does not predict climate opinion, as
opposed to subjective harm from the event. Similarly,
case studies of particular events like a ﬂood event in
Boulder, Colorado [78] or a drought in the US Midwest [29] show no effect on climate opinions. By contrast, a study in New Jersey ﬁnds that hurricane
exposure predicts support for pro-climate political
candidates [27].
3.1.4. The effect of climate opinion on perceptions or
subjective experiences of local weather
A subset of studies focuses on how people perceive
weather or climate conditions at the local level. Rather
than using beliefs about global climate change as a
dependent variable, these studies examine whether
people perceive the climate in their local area to be
getting warmer, whether recent seasons are warmer or
colder than normal, or related local climate trends
[25, 35, 36, 38, 39, 50, 60, 61, 71, 79–81].
Multiple studies have found that these subjective
experiences of local weather or climate conditions are
associated with broader climate opinions and political
afﬁliation or ideology. In short, people who are already
4

more concerned about global warming are more likely
to think they have experienced its impacts, or have
experienced weather conditions consistent with global
warming [35, 36, 38, 39, 61, 71]. These trends are typically attributed to motivated reasoning or related
phenomena.
Although studies of local climate perceptions show
that climate opinions shape such perceptions, they
also show that people are often able to detect a signal of
local weather or climate despite biases created by
motivated reasoning. For example, a study of Oklahoma residents found that they were able to perceive
local seasonal temperature and precipitation anomalies despite biases introduced by political ideology
[81]. Similarly, a study in Norway found that perceptions of seasonal temperature and precipitation were
strongly associated with measured conditions while
also exhibiting biases associated with climate opinions
[36]. Detection of climate trends at the local level may
be limited to larger-magnitude variations across large
areas; however, a study in Florida found that ﬁve-year
trends in temperature were not associated with perceived temperature trends across the state, although
trends in precipitation were faintly detected [32]. The
types of self-reported weather experiences shaped by
climate opinions have not yet been fully explored, but
there are suggestions that temperature-related experiences are more sensitive to biases driven by climate
opinions than experiences related to precipitation or
other extreme events [36, 38, 50].
3.2. Measurement diversity
A major constraint on systematic comparison of this
literature stems from measurement diversity.
Although the papers we review generally share the aim
of identifying how experiences with weather and
climate inﬂuence climate opinions, both the suite of
treatments (i.e. potential explanatory factors) and the
speciﬁc outcome variables of interest vary considerably. Whether experience is measured through selfreported or objective data, many additional non-trivial
discrepancies exist. Survey questions are worded
differently, and weather and climate data are integrated from diverse sources with varying spatiotemporal extent and resolution. Furthermore, climate
indicators are operationalized in many different ways,
and distinct approaches exist for spatially and temporally matching climate indicators to respondents. First,
we explore the diversity in measurements of physical
climate changes, the treatment of interest. Then, we
consider the diversity of dependent variables that
scholars have examined.
3.2.1. Heterogeneous measurement and conceptualization
of independent variables
Measurements of climate and weather (the treatment
variables) vary considerably across the studies we
review. As noted previously, a ﬁrst-order distinction is
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between the 32 papers that measure the effect of
subjective or reported experiences of weather and
climate, versus the 51 papers that examine the
inﬂuence of objectively measured weather and climate
changes. Ten papers examine both subjectively (selfreported) and objectively measured weather or climate
changes.
Local temperature measurements used in these
studies vary in their use of absolute versus relative
values, spatial extents and time intervals, and data
sources. Temperature data for many studies are taken
from the Global or United States Historical Climatological Network, which is an integrated database of climate summaries from land surface stations subjected
to a common suite of quality assurance review. Station
data are limited, however, in their ability to represent
the continuous range of weather conditions across the
Earth’s surface. As distance increases from a station, its
accuracy in capturing local conditions declines. Thus,
it may be difﬁcult to accurately represent weather
experiences for populations living distant from a
weather station (a challenge that is particularly prevalent in areas of the developing world with sparse station networks). To address this issue, other studies use
gridded datasets derived from station and/or satellite
data that create a continuous surface of modeled
weather or climate variables. One example is the parameter-elevation regressions on independent slopes
model (PRISM) dataset [82], which combines data
from a variety of US monitoring networks. PRISM
employs a range of modeling techniques that incorporate the inﬂuences of topography, for example, to
derive spatially accurate estimates of climate parameters. Whether the use of these divergent data sources explains divergent ﬁndings has not been
systematically assessed. In particular, it is not clear
whether one type of data source provides climate data
closer to what individuals in a particular location actually perceive. As a result, it is impossible to carefully
diagnose the source of observed differences in treatment effects between studies employing these different
datasets and associated indicators derived from these
datasets. Similarly, there are multiple different sources
of data and ways of calculating long-term temperature
trends and extremes, including a heat stress index [32],
climate extremes indices (e.g. [46]) and annual or seasonal trends based on temperature minimums, maximums, or means (e.g. [61, 67]).
Other weather and climate measurements are also
characterized by these measurement inconsistencies.
For example, heavy precipitation must be measured
relative to some ‘normal’ base period or distribution,
whether as deviations or percentiles. Heavy precipitation is also highly localized. In contrast, the extended
absence of precipitation (i.e. drought) has a much larger and more homogeneous spatial imprint than
heavy precipitation events, temperature anomalies or
heat waves; it is also measured very differently.
Drought can be measured through the duration of
5

consecutive dry days, but thus far analyses of drought
perceptions have relied on readily available indices
such as the Palmer Drought Severity Index [28, 73, 79]
or the US Drought Monitor [29, 68, 72]. Such indices,
however, were not originally designed from the perspective of understanding how people experience
weather and climate change but rather were designed
for use in climatological, agricultural, and similar purposes. It remains unclear whether drought measurements operationalized in this fashion are consistent
with how individuals perceive or experience drought.
Many papers that consider subjective experience
focus on experience with extreme events or disasters,
especially ﬂooding [24, 47, 48, 52–54], but also tropical
cyclones, drought, wildﬁre, and other changes
[47, 49]. Such differences are non-trivial, as each event
carries very different risks, is associated with different
economic costs, and affects individuals and communities in very different ways. We need to better understand the different interpretations of subjective
experiences in these varied contexts. At least one study
explores this topic with open-ended responses, which
provides insight into the diversity of interpretations of
personal experience [59]. Additional studies using
open-ended responses would be productive to understand the variety of ways in which climate change is
expressed and perceived locally.
3.2.2. Heterogeneous measurement and conceptualization
of dependent variables
As with the independent variables, the variety of
dependent variables is also substantial (table 1). Studies examine a diverse range of climate experiences
and opinions, from whether individuals accurately
detect changes in their local area (measured instrumentally) [32, 35, 83], to whether measured (or
reported) changes are associated with increased awareness, a change in affect or emotion [48, 52], beliefs (e.g.
[25, 76]), belief certainty [13, 37], risk perceptions (e.g.
[6]), self efﬁcacy, mitigation or adaptation policy
preferences (e.g. [23, 62]), and intended behaviors. We
identiﬁed no studies that measured actual behavioral
changes. However, some studies measured behavioral
intentions, including political behaviors, such as support for green politicians [27], media use [83], and
intended reductions in energy use [24]. Most studies
rely on individual question items but some construct
narrow [70] or broad [65] risk perception indices from
multiple items.
3.2.3. Variation in geographic coverage
Examining the intersection of weather or climate and
perceived experience or climate opinions requires
careful attention to spatial considerations. Researchers
make decisions about the scale of the study (from local
to global), the distribution of individuals within the
study domain, the distribution of weather or climate
trends and events considered, and how climate data
will be matched with individuals in the study. The
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Table 1. Examples of survey question wordings used as dependent variables in selected studies.
Concept

Item

Perceptions of local ﬂooding frequency change

Comparing the past 10 years with 20 or 30 years ago, do you think that number and
size of destructive ﬂoods in New Hampshire have: [Increased; Stayed the same;
Decreased; Don’t know/no answer]
Recently, you may have noticed that global warming has been getting some attention
in the news. Global warming refers to the idea that the world’s average temperature
has been increasing over the past 150 years, may be increasing more in the future,
and that the world’s climate may change as a result. What do you think? Do you
think that global warming is happening? [Yes; No; Don’t know]
Do you think climate change is a serious problem for the whole world? [Not severe at
all; Not so severe; Somewhat severe; Very severe; Not clear]
From what you know about global climate change or global warming, which one of
the following statements comes closest to your opinion? [Global climate change has
been established as a serious problem and immediate action is necessary; There is
enough evidence that climate change is taking place and some action should be
taken; We don’t know enough about global climate change and more research is
necessary before we take any actions; Concern about global climate change is exaggerated and no action is necessary; Global climate change is not occurring and this
is not a real issue.]
Have you experienced any extreme weather conditions that you interpret as caused by
long-term, global climate change? [Yes, probably; Do not know; Probably not;
Deﬁnitely not]
I will support a national policy to mitigate climate change. [1=Strongly disagree;
7=Strongly agree]
How serious of a threat do you think global warming is to [You and your family; Your
local community; People of Florida; People in the United States; People in other
countries; Plants and animals] [1=Very serious; 4=Not at all serious]
The cold winter which occurred during late 2010 suggests that climate change may
not be happening. [5-point scale Strongly agree-Strongly disagree]
How much do you personally worry about global warming? [A great deal; A fair
amount; Only a little; Not at all]

Global warming beliefs

Global warming beliefs
Global warming beliefs

Perceived experience with climate
change
Support for climate policy
Global warming risk perceptions

Weather as evidence for or against climate change
Concern about global warming

Citation

Table 2. Overview of papers by focus
country.
Country

Number of papers

United States
United Kingdom
China
Norway
New Zealand
Taiwan

52
8
4
2
1
1

Multiple countries

5

studies reviewed span the full range of local to global
analyses, but the vast majority are conducted within
the United States, and many are national (table 2). The
spatial distribution of people and climate are given
varying degrees of attention. Samples may be selected
based on particular extreme weather events in order to
directly test the effects of those events (e.g. ﬂooding).
In other cases, an exploratory approach is taken. In
some cases, respondents’ locations are known (i.e.
household addresses) and so analyses are performed at
the individual level (e.g. [31, 32, 38, 66]), whereas in
other cases respondents are aggregated by zip code,
county, or even state levels (e.g. [8, 12]). The varying
degrees of mismatch between respondent locations
6

[80]

[31]

[47]
[72]

[60]

[55]
[32]

[26]
[30]

and weather or climate ‘treatments’ introduces uncertainties into any assessment of treatment effects.
Based on the geographic scope of studies identiﬁed
in the review, it is clear that more non-US research is
necessary, especially in China, India, and the global
South, which represent some of the areas most vulnerable to climate change impacts. In addition, for studies
that focus on the effects of climate changes that have
relatively well-deﬁned spatial signatures (e.g. wildﬁres,
ﬂooding, hurricanes), careful attention should be paid
not only to the location of respondents within the geographic area, but also to how those respondents are
matched with their respective weather or climate
treatments. Weighting climate indicators according to
the spatial distribution of population densities within
a county or state, for example, is a relatively straightforward way to account for the uneven distribution of
both climate and population in any area (e.g. [1, 84]).
Population density grids are publicly available and
would improve estimates of treatment effects in places
that encompass large rural or sparsely-populated areas
in particular.
3.3. Methodological approaches
Although sharing a similar aim, the studies reviewed
here vary in their speciﬁc objectives and thus employ a
range of methods (table 3). They also build on a long

Citation

Brief summary

Borick and Rabe, 2014

[20]

Brody et al, 2008
Brooks et al, 2014
Broomell et al, 2015

[70]
[6]
[58]

Broomell et al, 2017

[35]

Brulle et al, 2012
Capstick and Pidgeon, 2014

[28]
[26]

Carlton et al, 2016

[29]

Carmichael and Brulle, 2017
Carmichael et al, 2017

[30]
[73]

Cutler, 2016

[76]

Dai et al, 2015

[49]

Demski et al, 2017

[21]

Deryugina, 2013

[7]

Donner and McDaniels, 2013
Druckman and Shafranek, 2016

[8]
[93]

Egan and Mullin, 2012

[9]

In one Michigan county, perceived personal experience of global warming was associated with heightened global warming risk perceptions. (Alger County, Michigan, United States)
An index of US public opinion polls found that public concern about climate change peaked in 2000 and 2017 and coincided with state temperature anomalies. (United States)
Strength of belief in climate change and perception of local effects were found to predict climate adaptation opinions among private forest owners. (Portugal, Germany, Sweden)
Although forest managers were aware of local environmental change, awareness was not associated with adaptive action to climate change. (Oregon, United States)
Very cold or warm temperature anomalies from a 5 year baseline predicted perceptions of global warming impacts. Temperature anomalies exacerbated political polarization over the causal
attribution of global warming. (United States)
Seasonal snowfall and temperature departures from normal predicted beliefs about the existence of global warming; respondents reported that weather was important in shaping their views.
(United States)
No correlation between long-term trend in number of warmer-than-average days per year and climate change risk perception. (United States)
Temperature anomalies on the day individuals were surveyed was associated with concern about climate change. (United States)
A multi-country survey found that respondents were more likely to support general mitigation efforts than speciﬁc actions of mitigation, and support was predicted by personal experiences
with global warming. (Australia; Brazil; Canada; Chile; China; Germany; Spain; France; Hong Kong; Israel; India; Italy; Japan; Korea; Netherlands; Poland; Russia; South Africa; Slovakia;
Sweden; Turkey; Taiwan; United Kingdom; United States)
Results from a randomized experiment found that individuals were generally able to perceive signiﬁcant temperature anomalies but classiﬁed less extreme anomalies based on their global
warming beliefs. (United States)
National aggregate indices of extreme weather did not have an effect on aggregate public opinion about climate change over nine years. (United States)
Individuals interpreted cold weather based on levels of pre-existing skepticism about climate change. However, after a period of abnormally cold temperatures, three times as many people
interpreted the anomalies as evidence of the climate change.(United Kingdom)
After a period of drought in the US Midwest in 2012, there were no signiﬁcant changes in climate change beliefs or attitudes toward adaptation among agricultural advisors. (Indiana, Iowa,
Michigan, Nebraska, United States)
Weather events were minimally associated with the level of concern about climate change; only extreme drought conditions were related to climate change concern. (United States)
An analysis of the factors inﬂuencing public concern about climate change (between 2002 and 2013) found that extreme weather did not increase concern about climate change among
Democrats or Republicans. (United States)
Household income, political party afﬁliation, beliefs about climate change, and property damage from severe weather events were found to have an interactive effect to shape perceptions of
climate change risk. (United States)
Perceived experiences of extreme weather events (particularly heatwaves) in ﬁve cities in China were strongly correlated with climate change beliefs. Physical or ﬁnancial damages due to
extreme weather events strengthened the relationship. (China)
Flooding experience in the UK was associated with greater perceived vulnerability and risk perceptions of climate change, and support for mitigation and adaptation policies. (United
Kingdom)
Short-term temperature ﬂuctuations (1 day–2 weeks) had no effect on global warming beliefs, but longer-term ﬂuctuations (1 month–1 year) were predictors of global warming beliefs
according to an analysis of longitudinal survey data. Only respondents with conservative political ideology were affected by temperature anomalies. (United States)
Aggregate climate change belief and concern was correlated to national mean temperature anomalies over the previous 3–12 months. (United States)
Participants who were primed to think about temperatures over a long period of time were less likely to overestimate the percentage of abnormally warm days over the past year. Temperature
on the day of the survey was correlated with global warming belief, worry, and anthropogenic attribution among the control group, but not the primed group. (United States)
Local temperatures over the past week were associated with climate change beliefs. However, the effect was not related to long-term attitude change. (United States)
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Respondents were more likely to report that they had personally experienced climate change when surveyed on abnormally warm days. Respondents who reported believing in climate change
were more likely to report they had experienced climate change and the effect was stronger among those who attributed climate change to anthropogenic causes. (New York State, United
States)
Actual weather changes were less predictive of perceived changes in local temperatures, but better predictors of perceived ﬂooding and droughts. Beliefs about local changes in temperature
were more politicized than beliefs about changes in precipitation. (United States)
Winter warming was associated with a greater probability of perceiving local climate change, even after adjusting for unexplained regional differences. (19 counties in Alabama, Colorado,
Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Mississippi, New Hampshire, Oregon, Washington, United States)
Climate change beliefs were predicted by temperature anomalies on the interview day and the previous day. Temperature effects were concentrated among those who identiﬁed as political
independents. (New Hampshire, United States)
Older residents were more likely to perceive that summer temperatures had increased. Three subgroups assumed to have greater experience with land including forest owners, year-round
residents, and long-term residents were neither more nor less likely than others to perceive warming summer temperatures. (Northeast Oregon, United States)
Perceptions of ﬂood risk were associated with political ideology rather than physical vulnerability or personal experience with local weather changes. (New Hampshire, United States)
Subjective experiences of seasonal average temperature and precipitation during the previous winter and summer were related to recorded weather conditions and beliefs about global
warming. (United States)
Respondents were sensitive to changes in temperature and precipitation, but global warming beliefs had a large effect on perceptions of seasonal temperature, and less on seasonal precipitation. (Norway)
Respondents’ global warming beliefs were correlated with outdoor temperatures during the study. (Northwestern United States)
Temperature anomalies accounted for spatial variation in the percentage of the population that believes that global warming is happening at the county level (United States)
There was a positive relationship between extreme weather experience and concern about climate change. However, the effect of extreme weather on public concern was only signiﬁcant for
recent weather events. (United States)
People who believed they had experienced rising temperatures in recent years were more likely to express belief in global warming. (United States)
A multi-country survey found country level variation in the predictors of climate change awareness and risk perceptions. Perceived temperature change was a signiﬁcant predictor across
nearly all geographies, but strongest in Africa and Asia. (119 countries)
Respondents reported temporarily higher levels of support for agricultural adaptation policies after exposure to abnormally warm temperatures. (Michigan, United States)
Respondents surveyed in the US and Australia that believed the day that they were surveyed was warmer than usual expressed greater concern about climate change (and weremore willing to
donate money to a global-warming charity) compared to those who thought the day was cooler than usual. (United States; Australia)
Residents’ concern about climate change was associated with perceptions of changes in local temperatures and cyclone frequency. (Hong Kong, China)
Norwegians who reported that they experienced natural hazard damages were more concerned about personal consequences of climate change. (Norway)
Subjective experience of extreme weather events was associated with climate change beliefs for less visible events (droughts and polar vortex) as opposed to more overt events like tornadoes,
hurricanes, and ﬂoods. Objective indicators were unrelated to climate opinion. (United States)
Respondents were unable to detect 5 year increases in temperature, but some could detect change in precipitation. Climate change risk perceptions were more strongly predicted by subjective
experiences of environmental change, climate change beliefs, and political ideology compared to local weather variables. (Florida, United States)
Variation in a climate extremes index did not inﬂuence perceptions of the timing of climate change and had a negligible effect on perceptions of the seriousness of climate change. (United
States)
Temperature anomalies inﬂuenced perceived warming but not attribution of warmer-than-usual winter temperatures (to global warming). Abnormally warm temperatures were inﬂuenced
more by scientiﬁc agreement, anthropogenic attribution of climate change, perceived risk of global warming, and political orientation. (United States)
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Perceived personal experience of global warming was associated with increased global warming belief certainty. Inversely, high belief certainty inﬂuenced perceptions of personal experience.
(United States)
Farmers who expressed belief in anthropogenic climate change were more likely to perceive increased temperatures than farmers who did not express belief in climate change. (New Zealand)
Respondents with a strong ability to cope with ﬂooding were unlikely to experience negative emotions that might prompt personal action to mitigate climate change; coping ability moderates
the link between ﬂood experience and mitigation intentions. (United Kingdom)
Personal experience of a ﬂooding event predicted perceived threat from climate change, and indirectly predicted mitigation responses among individuals who attributed the ﬂoods to climate
change. (United Kingdom)
Recent experience with hot summers, warm winters, droughts, and natural disasters was minimally associated with attitude change related to anthropogenic climate change. (United States)
Wealthier respondents were found to be overrepresented in surveys during warmer temperatures. Exposure to unseasonable temperatures was correlated with reduced concern about climate
change. (United States)
Individuals who experienced recent extreme weather events were more likely to support climate change adaptation policy in general, but the effect was variable across speciﬁc adaptation
policies and diminished with time. (United States)
Survey respondents generally perceived climate anomalies, especially when anomalies were extreme and persistent; this ﬁnding was robust to political differences. (Oklahoma, United States)
In an experimental study, participants who experienced higher temperatures were more likely to believe in the existence of global warming. (Cornell University and University of Chicago,
United States)
New Jersey residents who experienced signiﬁcant hurricane impacts were more likely to support politicians who supported of climate change policies. (New Jersey, United States)
Among climate skeptics, those primed with cold weather exhibited a decrease in belief in global warming, but not climate change. (Upstate New York, United States)
In a large survey dataset, there was a modest positive relationship between the most recent seven-day temperature anomaly and the likelihood of reporting that global warming is occurring.
(United States)
Political orientation was found to have a stronger inﬂuence on perceptions of local weather conditions compared to objective weather conditions. Local weather perceptions were found to
inﬂuence climate change attitudes. (United States)
Individuals who had experienced increasing summer temperatures were more likely to perceive immediate impacts and severity of global warming. (United States)
Individuals exposed to long-term trends of abnormally warm summer temperatures and cooler spring temperatures were more likely to perceive the existence of anthropogenic global
warming. (United States)
Individuals who expressed belief that global warming is happening, and should be a priority were more likely to perceive recent weather anomalies. Perceived weather was much more
predictive of global warming beliefs than observed weather. (United States)
Warmer winter temperatures and cooler spring temperatures over the past 10 years was associated with the belief that overall global temperatures have been rising. (United States)
Residents connected ﬂooding events to climate change despite contradictory scientiﬁc claims about the relationship. Events did not change existing climate change beliefs but did facilitate a
greater sense of vulnerability and increased awareness about climate change risk. (Boulder County, Colorado, United States)
The state of the economy had a signiﬁcant effect on attitudes toward emissions reduction, however, annual temperature deviations did not. (Austria; Belgium; Bulgaria; Croatia; Cyprus;
Czech Republic; Denmark; Estonia; Finland; France; Germany; Greece; Hungary; Ireland; Italy; Latvia; Lithuania; Luxembourg; Malta; Netherlands; Poland; Portugal; Romania; Slovakia;
Slovenia; Spain; Sweden; United Kingdom)
Those who had direct experience with ﬂooding expressed greater concern about climate change. Greater concern about climate change was associated with a stronger willingness to mitigate
climate change. (United Kingdom)
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Climate-related disaster experience did not have a signiﬁcant impact on perceptions of global warming severity or perceived personal impact. (Taiwan)
Respondents perceived heat waves and hot summer temperatures as less common during their lifetimes. However, periods of heavy rainfall, coastal erosion, and mild winters were perceived
to have increased in frequency. Climate change beliefs were predicted by perceived changes in hot and wet-weather related events. (United Kingdom)
Personal experience with extreme weather events predicted climate risk perceptions, but risk perceptions were also strongly related to affect. (United Kingdom)
The occurrence of a typhoon predicted perceived experience of unusual weather among Chinese respondents, while abnormally warm summer temperatures did not. Typhoon occurrence
also indirectly predicted global warming belief certainty and attitudes toward mitigation behavior. (China)
Personal experience with climate change impacts positively predicted climate change beliefs. (China)
Flood victims did not exhibit a signiﬁcant difference from non-victims in their understanding of and responses to climate change. However, experience of air pollution signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced perceptions of climate change and behavioral responses. (south England, United Kingdom)
Local temperature trends predicted climate change policy support, as did sea level rise risk. (United States)
An analysis of selected US communities exposed to extreme weather events found that reported harm aligned with proximity and community damages from the event. However, interpretations of the events and attributions to climate change were guided by political ideology.(Laurel County, Kentucky; Winston County, Mississippi; Yavapai County, Arizona, Lake County,
California, United States)
Present temperature anomalies were associated with an overestimation of the frequency of similar past events, which was related to an increased belief in and concern for global warming.
(United States)
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history of exploiting natural weather variations to
study social science phenomena. Often, weather is
used as an econometric ‘instrument’: a source of
random variation that predicts a variable of interest
and thus helps to estimate an endogenous variable’s
causal effect on an outcome of interest. For example,
scholars have used rainfall variation to study the
relationship between economic growth and civil conﬂict [85], the relationship between poverty and crime
[86], and the relationship between riots and property
value [87]. Scholars in both economics and political
science have also examined the direct causal effect of
weather variation on economic and political outcomes
[88–90].
Scholarship on weather and public opinion can
theoretically exploit this same variation. Studies of
weather and public opinion can thus beneﬁt from the
fact that weather is a direct object of interest (the
‘treatment’), and that plausible sources of exogenous
variation in this treatment are readily available. Yet,
the literature reviewed here is divided by its attention
to causal inference.

Third, because weather varies geographically, geographic patterns of a particular weather variable may
sometimes coincide with the geographic patterns of
other unmeasured social, cultural, political, or demographic predictors. This means that meteorological
variables may be correlated with other latent phenomena that are also causal drivers of a particular dependent variable. For example, if a period of cold weather
strikes the central US while coastal areas are hotter
than normal, then this weather pattern will be strongly
correlated with underlying patterns of American political geography. This correlation will bias a cross-sectional multivariate analysis that predicts opinion using
cold weather experiences. A related complication
arises due to the possibility of multiple comparisons.
Weather and climate datasets contain a wide range of
variables that may be used as predictors of, for example, individual survey responses. These variables can
be aggregated over multiple time periods selected by
the researchers. Without adjustment, multiple comparisons among predictors can increase the risk of
inferential errors.

3.3.1. The limits of model-dependent inference
At one pole, a number of papers describe associations
between weather experiences and climate opinions
without explicit attention to causal identiﬁcation.
These papers rely on multivariate controls to estimate
the the effect of weather on diverse outcomes.
However, these studies face certain limitations.
First, weather conditions are spatially autocorrelated;
in other words, conditions are likely to be more similar
for participants located closer to each other. Spatial
dependence is inherent in many human and physical
processes. Traditional regression models assume independence between observations. However, when
studying the relationship between weather and public
opinion, it is particularly important to account for
spatial dependence in predictor variables. This will
reduce the chance of underestimating standard errors
and the likelihood of Type I errors (or incorrectly
rejecting a null hypothesis). Multi-level models, clustered standard errors, or geographically weighted
regression are several methods to account for geographic structure in predictors. However, most papers
focused on the relationship between weather and climate opinions do not attempt to account for possible
errors introduced by spatial autocorrelation using
these or other methods, nor do they attempt to measure the extent to which spatial autocorrelation is present in their modeled regression residuals (though
see [38]).
Second, studies that rely on self-reported measures
of weather exposure face an additional inferential
threat. In these cases, it can be difﬁcult to tell whether
public opinion responds to weather exposure, or perceptions of weather exposure are motivated by underlying opinions (see section 3.1.4 above).

3.3.2. Causal identiﬁcation of weather on perceptions
A limited set of papers address these methodological
issues head-on. These papers use as-if random variation in weather as the basis for their research design.
Of course, most weather patterns are not randomly
assigned across a large country or region. Instead,
causal identiﬁcation claims rest on the idea that,
conditional on a particular area or geography, variation in weather is as-if random.
These papers thus exploit randomness in shortterm or local weather conditions to test how weather
extremes shape public opinion [7, 9, 65]. According to
the logic of these papers, weather patterns vary more
arbitrarily within a given county or local area. These
differences can be causally identiﬁed. By contrast,
when everyone in a given area is simultaneously treated with a large event like a hurricane or regional heat
wave, then our efforts to understand the causal effect
of weather will be compromised by non-random factors that are simultaneously associated with both
weather trends and climate opinions.
These threats to inference can be managed through
the inclusion of geographic ﬁxed effects, preferably at
the local level. Yet, only a handful of papers covered by
this review include ﬁxed or random effects at any level,
including regional [20, 33, 46, 68], state [7, 9, 39, 91], or
geographies below the state level (e.g. county, city,
weather station) [9, 22, 36, 49, 65, 76, 77, 79].
Further, these studies would then beneﬁt from
demonstrating that, conditional on geographic ﬁxed
effects, populations which receive a particular weather
treatment are identical to those that do not (but see [9]
who do show that observed covariates cannot predict
weather ﬂuctuations). Instead, some articles simply
assume that ‘weather ﬂuctuations are as good as random once geographic controls are included’ ([7],
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p 406). More work needs to be done by the research
community to understand whether or when this
assumption is founded.
When pooling data over time, articles should also
include time dummies to control for secular shocks
[9, 31, 33, 62, 65, 81] or other more sophisticated controls such as linear time trends [65]. Similarly,
between-country analyses should utilize country-level
ﬁxed or random effects [34, 63].
While the majority of observational studies
reviewed relied on cross-sectional statistical analysis, a
growing group of papers exploit panel data. These
papers provide traction in estimating whether shifts in
weather conditions are linked to shifting public opinions [8, 19, 28, 30, 31, 34, 37, 63, 65, 81]. Their results
are not always consistent with cross-sectional studies
(see above). In part, the drivers of shifts in climate opinions may not be the same as the drivers of absolute
climate opinion levels. At the same time, panel analysis
controls for a greater number of potential omitted
variables, including any factors that are time-invariant
in two-way ﬁxed effect speciﬁcations.
An even smaller set of papers (n=5) involve
researcher-controlled experimental tests. Since
researchers cannot control weather itself, these papers
tend to test the causal effect of messages about extreme
weather or exposure to particular extreme weather
prompts. For example [18, 92], use a survey experiment to test whether public opinion in the aftermath
of an extreme event changes whether a survey gauges
their opinion on ‘climate change’ or ‘global warming’.
Another study [93] evaluates how shaping the prompt
used to encourage evaluation of weather experiences
shapes opinion. Other studies examine the effect of
information, heat-related, or problem-severity primes
[11, 18]. The lone article reviewed that used lab experiments [16] ﬁnds that warmth and thirst both increased
subject belief in climate change and desertiﬁcation
risks. Beyond direct experience, climate-related
experiences may also occur indirectly through exposure to media coverage or communication with other
people such as friends or family. In addition, media
coverage may interact with direct experience in inﬂuencing climate opinions. Future research should
examine how such indirect experiences, and communication about direct experiences, might inﬂuence climate opinions. For example, such research could
combine techniques to measure exposure to weatherrelated events with emerging techniques to measure
exposure to media content [94] or online activity [95].
More broadly, the vast majority of articles
reviewed here are quantitative in their approach.
These articles all rely on cross-sectional or panel analysis of survey datasets. Only two articles we reviewed
approached the study of opinion through qualitative
interview-based or ethnographic lenses [57, 78]. For
example [57], draws from 50 interviews with landowners in Oregon. These studies remind us that public
attitudes towards climate change should not simply be
12

reduced to survey scales. Instead, there is value in
understanding the rich and multidimensional content
of climate opinions, and understanding the ways in
which weather experiences construct these beliefs. In
general, this approach is under-represented in the
existing literature. Some excellent work on this topic
fell outside this review’s sampling strategy, since it has
been published in book form. For example [96], presents an ethnographic study on public experiences
with an unusually mild winter in a Norwegian town.
The book outlines how public engagement with climate change is shaped by social efforts to regulate
emotions. In line with works like these, scholars with
expertise in interview, focus-group. Focus-group and
ethnographic methods could make a major contribution to this literature by expanding the scope of
research on weather and public opinion.
3.4. The need for theoretical context and integration
The studies reviewed draw on theoretical frameworks
from across many disciplines. Some studies forego
theoretical groundings and limit their focus to documenting empirical associations (e.g. [10, 66, 73]),
however, many [16, 48, 59, 61, 77, 83] contextualize
their work using one of two psychological theories:
dual-process theory [97], which emerged from the
cognitive-experiential self theory [98], and construal
level theory (CLT) [99].
Dual-process theory distinguishes between two
parallel and interacting modes of information processing—experiential (also called System 1) and analytical
(System 2). Experiential processing is fast, and driven
by affect and intuition. It encodes reality through concrete images and emotions [98]. Analytical (System 2)
processing is conscious, deliberative, and comparatively slow. It employs abstract symbols, words, and
numbers to encode reality. Critically, experiential processing predicts attitudes and behaviors much more
strongly than analytical processing because it requires
less cognitive effort [100]. However, both systems
operate together to support judgments and decisionmaking. Although their interactions can be highly
nuanced depending on context and may relate to other
key psychological aspects like emotion [101], we highlight the potential importance of experiential versus
analytical processing for individual interpretation of
their weather-related experiences (ﬁgure 1).
CLT theorizes the nature and importance of psychological distance [99]. CLT argues that we understand and interact with the world according to the
perceived ‘psychological distance’ of different stimuli.
Distances are measured along different dimensions
including space, time, and hypotheticality. Transcending our here-and-now selves requires different levels
of abstraction, or mental construal [99]. Higher levels
of construal and abstraction—and thus psychologically distant concepts—are expected to require more
analytical processing. Likewise, phenomena that are
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Figure 1. Conceptual diagram of contextual factors that relate to climate change opinions. Concepts range in distance and time from
local/short-term to distant/long-term (x-axis) as well as in psychological distance (y-axis). Climate change opinions may be shaped by
local weather experiences. In turn, climate opinions may inﬂuence perceptions of local to regional weather or extreme events.
Psychologically near concepts, regardless of whether they are near or distant in space or time, are likely to be more compelling in
communication.

physically close in both time and space (or hypotheticality) may induce more experiential processing.
Given that experiential processing can be more
powerful than analytical processing in driving decisionmaking and behavior, physically and psychologically
close experiences of climate change, such as abnormally
hot days, may inﬂuence climate opinions more than
longer-term, gradual or distant climatic change. And
indeed, the effect of short-term weather (e.g. on the day
of a survey) on climate opinions has been demonstrated
in many studies [10, 11, 16, 61, 93]. However, using
recent or available information about the weather or
extreme events can also decrease climate risk perceptions [102, 103].
Moreover, the natural variability of weather and
seasonal cycles (including winter, even in a much warmer world) make it inherently problematic to emphasize experiential processing and limit analytical
reasoning in motivating climate actions. Likewise, gradual trends in climate can be difﬁcult to detect against
the backdrop of natural climate variability. Thus,
many studies that examine the inﬂuence of subtle climate trends or anomalies on climate opinions ﬁnd
essentially no effects at all [28, 31, 32, 72].
While experiential and analytic processing underlie all reasoning about climate change to some extent
[100], neither imply a speciﬁc result for climate opinions. Individual reactions to weather experiences will
thus be inﬂuenced by values, worldviews, associations,
and emotions. Similarly, changes to the ‘psychological
distance’ of climate change can have diverse effects. A
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distant frame may invoke analytical reasoning,
whereas a more proximate perspective may be more
emotionally engaging [104]. While either frame could
potentially increase motivation to reduce climate
change more than the other, psychologically close
frames, regardless of whether they are geographically
near or far, are likely to be most engaging.

4. Conclusions
The growing number of articles to study the relationship between climate experiences and climate opinion
highlight sustained interest among researchers on this
topic. Yet, our review reveals substantial heterogeneity
of research setting, variable choice, methodological
approach, and theoretical frameworks. In light of these
differences, systematic comparisons remain difﬁcult.
In general, scholars have found modest evidence that
short-term variation in temperature increases climate
opinions. However, the size of the temperatureopinion effect—if present—is likely to be small.
Efforts to identify the links between shifts in precipitation rates and extreme weather events also remain
unsettled.
Practically, if climatic anomalies exhibited a large
inﬂuence on public opinion (for example, equivalent
to the inﬂuence of political afﬁliation on climate opinion in the US) such a large effect would likely have
been detected, given the multi-decade research record
reviewed here. However, even modest effects may have
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important consequences for future public opinion
trends as temperatures rise and experiences with unusual weather accumulate; long-term studies may
enable better detection of such effects [105]. These
cumulative impacts of climate change may yet be sufﬁcient to motivate local to national political action. At
the same time, scholars should remind policymakers
that retrospective evidence from previous weather
conditions or climate trends is limited in its applicability to future conditions. An important consideration for future research is the extent to which local
weather conditions or anomalous events become normalized among current and future populations. For
example, there are hints that local temperature
anomalies quickly become unremarkable in public
discourse [106]. Such acclimatization may hinder the
ability of populations to perceive the true magnitude
of underlying climate trends and limit the generalizability of ﬁndings about the effect of past weather on
opinion.
We particularly urge researchers in this space to
pay careful attention to research design. The combination of georeferenced surveys with georeferenced
weather observations allows researchers to reliably
estimate the unique local weather conditions for individual survey respondents. This type of research
design is common among papers we reviewed. It offers
a major advance against research efforts that measure
associations between self-reported experiences and
opinions, which we suggest have a limited capacity to
identify the causal effect of weather on opinion. However, we also suggest researchers pay more attention to
the limitations imposed by geography: people living
close to each other are more likely to experience the
same weather conditions, yet people in close proximity to each other also tend to be more similar in general (in terms of sociodemographics) than to people
farther away. This is also the case for climate change
opinions, where people in nearby communities tend
to have similar opinions [69]. This makes it challenging to statistically identify how weather conditions or
a weather event may have inﬂuenced peopleʼs beliefs
and attitudes without careful attention to the distribution of weather events. Indeed, spatial dependence in
weather conditions may explain some of the variation
in effects shown in the literature. Researchers must be
particularly attentive to issues of spatial autocorrelation, omitted variables, and multiple comparisons.
One approach to managing geographic dependencies is to conceptualize weather conditions prior to a
survey as a natural experimental stimulus. Natural
experiments, if well-designed, can manage problems
posed by omitted variables, spatial dependence and
multiple comparisons. These approaches pay particular attention to the drivers of spatial variation in climatic events, and often include local-scale ﬁxed effects
in their speciﬁcations. In doing so, they can isolate
individuals who experience a weather event from
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those who do not but are otherwise similar. Other studies provide strong causal identiﬁcation by collecting
longitudinal data that allow changes in opinion to be
documented at the level of the individual.
Future research should also explore how contextand place-dependent experiences with climate change
affect climate opinions and behaviors. Widely available weather and climate data, while useful for measuring physical climate trends, may not correspond to
ways that people experience climate change in different places with varying cultural or environmental contexts. While our review did not explicitly focus on
non-weather-related experiences of climate change,
subsequent studies could separately investigate how
such experiences, such as sunny-day ﬂooding due to
sea-level rise, the impacts of ocean acidiﬁcation, or
glacial retreat shape climate change opinions. Further,
previous reviews have called for research in more
diverse geographic contexts [40, 41]. We echo this call,
and emphasize the particular importance of additional
research in the global South where many communities
will experience disproportionate impacts from climate
change.
We also note the apparent absence of studies that
examine the effects of climate-related experiences on
realized behavior (though see [107]). Instead, virtually
all quantitative literature on this topic uses surveybased measurements of opinions or, at best, behavioral intentions. We suggest that researchers give
particular attention to new social and political outcome variables that can increase the external validity of
research on this topic. For example, do climate-related
experiences increase the propensity of individuals to
undertake adaptive planning? Can extreme events
increase public uptake of new energy technologies? Do
climate-related experiences shape political participation or voting preferences? Behaviors among inﬂuential subpopulations are also an important area
for future research. For example, media coverage
decisions by journalists with respect to extreme
weather events may inﬂuence how people vicariously
experience such events or interpret their own
direct experiences. We expect that studies linking
weather experiences to realized behavioral outcomes
will advance the state of the ﬁeld.
Viewing the research reviewed through the lens of
psychological theory highlights additional avenues for
research. Understanding the constructed nature of
experience together with the importance of experiential processing in driving judgments and decision
making suggests that it may be helpful to improve our
understanding of how measured climate changes
inﬂuence subjective beliefs about those changes. If this
pathway can be strengthened, perhaps through a
clearer understanding of what changes exactly are
interpreted as evidence of global climate change, communication efforts could potentially be targeted to
reinforce causal models in the public mind.
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In addition, paying more attention to affect and
emotion as factors that can inﬂuence perceived experience with global warming may yield communication
beneﬁts. Overall, grounding future studies within relevant theoretical or conceptual frameworks may also
help to focus data collection initiatives and facilitate
the identiﬁcation of gaps in knowledge about how
objective and subjective weather drive climate opinions. Helping the public make causal connections
between their experiences of climate change and its
causes, impacts, and solutions will continue to require
active engagement by climate scientists, the media,
and others who understand the linkages. The more
those linkages can be made in a way that engages
experiential processing and minimizes psychological
distance, the more meaningful and effective they are
likely to be.
In sum, despite the sustained attention that this
topic has received, substantial gaps still remain in our
understanding of public responsiveness to climate
change-related experiences. This systematic review
points out some of these gaps. As the global population experiences weather that is increasingly outside
the range of historical memory, researchers, communicators, and policymakers must remain attentive to
these empirical needs to understand how climate
experiences shape public opinions and behaviors.
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